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Abstract 
 
The paper analyzes characteristics of the informal economy in Poland in the context of transition  using 
a specific survey carried out in the frame of the classic Labor Force Survey 1995 by the Polish National 
Statistical office (GUS). The participation probabilities of three types of informal activities (working, buying 
and hiring) are discussed. Their interdependencies are discussed the hypothesis of the network or neighborhood 
effects. The impact of the household’s participation on informal markets on its regular consumption is estimated 
by imputing the informal activity probabilities to the consumption surveys and panel. Then, the specific 
consumption profiles of participants in the informal market can be identified. This participation does influence 
significantly more than half of the household’s expenditure groups. Moreover, the participants of the informal 
economy distinguish themselves by the higher individual full prices (integrating non monetary constraints and 
resources). 
 
Key words: Informal economy, Consumer behavior, Cross-section-panel estimation  
JEL codes: D12 H26 J49 C31 C32  
 
Introduction. 
 During a transition period, such as experienced by Poland since the liberalization of 
foreign and domestic markets on the 1st January 1990, the old  type informal market activities 
have gradually disappeared as the official markets got stronger, but simultaneously new 
informal activities were created by the appearance of constraints on households or firms. For 
instance, subsistence constraints are likely to have appeared for households in 1989 and 1990, 
which might have obliged households to seek new sources of revenue and to minimize food 
prices by intervening on black markets. The gradual definition of the limits and organization 
of official markets can also have created new legal constraints for firms, which may use 
unofficial channels to weaken their transaction costs. It is particularly important to analyze 
the behavior of households on informal  markets during this period, as a mean to predict 
whether the informal economy will disappear soon after a first rise during a transition, or 
persist as a permanent structure (see Dupaigne-Hénin, 2001). Three reasons may drive 
households towards the black market: first the search for cheaper commodities in monetary 
terms. Second, rationing (this is essentially the same as the first cause, commodities being 
cheaper on the black market considering that the sum the monetary and the virtual prices are 
arising from constraints and non monetary resources. Third, the participation on one side of 
the informal economy, for instance by working unofficially, may create social interactions 
which lowers the cost of other unofficial activities, for instance by buying goods on the black 
market (see Fortin-Lacroix-Montmarquette, 2000). Therefore, by considering both the 
participation of the household on the informal markets and its official labor supply and 
consumption, we are able to answer two questions. First, - does participation  in various 
informal market activities is  interdependent giving rise to a multiplier effect? -question posed 
by Fortin-Lacroix-Montmarquette (2000) for working and buying activities. Second - is the 
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informal consumption driven mainly by a minimizing behavior when households are looking 
for smaller monetary prices and minimizing the risk of intervening on black markets, or rather 
by the appearance of subsistence constraints due to the transition ? In the last case, informal 
markets would disappear rapidly with these transitory subsistence constraints faced by 
households during the transition. 
 
This paper presents also some essential facts on the informal markets in Poland during 
the transition and proposes the statistical matching method to measure the income effect of  
informal activities on regular expenditures. In section 1 we present some historical and  
methodological comments how the hidden economy was measured in Poland on macro and  
micro level during the transition period. In section 2, we  define and estimate the participation 
probabilities including several types of informal economic activities: working, buying 
consumption goods and services or unregistered  hiring. We analyse also the socio economic 
profiles of the participating households  and interactions  between different types informal 
activities. Our data source in this part is an original large scale informal economy survey 
conducted together with classic Labour Force Survey (Extended LFS) in Poland  in 1995 (see 
appendix 2 for details). In the section 3 we estimate the impact of the informal markets 
participation probabilities on the regular consumption patterns using the extended LFS survey  
matched statistically with the1995  Household Budget Survey (HBS) and  with  the 
consumption panel issued from 1994-1996 time series of  HBS(see appendix 2 for details). 
The specific consumption behavior characteristics of informal markets participants are 
analyzed by estimating the cross section and panel  Almost Ideal DS-QAIDS models for the 
1994-1996 period.     
 
 1.  Measuring  the  determinants and effects of informal market participations in 
the transition context  
  
Informal economy is a natural market reaction in presence of governmental (or 
institutional) interventions and regulations (Fortin 2002). In the case non fully market 
regulated economy (like in the case of centrally planned economies and to less extent 
transition countries)  different types of rationing can be also source of the presence of  strong 
informal sector. The economic agents try to avoid the implied constraints or extra costs by 
different types of participation in the informal economy.. Thus, the size and evolution of the 
informal sector depends on the character and weight of the state or institutional restrictions. 
Comparing the size of  informal economy size among different types of countries 
(developed, developing and countries in transition) using  the same methodology (DYMIMIC 
macroeconomic model, Schneider (2007)) gives an idea of the relative importance of informal  
markets in various countries in the world with respect to their economic status. The transition 
countries average (39% of PIB) is higher than in the most developed countries (14%) but 
lower than in the developing countries (42%). Among transition countries there is also a great 
heterogeneity. Poland’s estimated share of informal economy in 2004/2005 is of  27% of the  
GDP  below the average  for all transition  countries   but above  the Central European 
transition countries (Hungary (25%), Slovak Republic(18%),Czech Republic(18%), 
 
In Poland, like in other transition countries the informal economy has always existed, 
but its character and nature has changed dramatically during the transition period. 
 
 In the pre-transition period the formal-informal duality of economy was based mainly 
on  multiple economic disequilibria resulting with a coexistence of generalized rationing with 
administered prices and almost free, informal  market sectors with equilibrium prices  for the 
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same goods and services. The specific role was played by dual (informal) foreign currencies 
market (essentially dollar) as a link between supply constrained  official  market and 
unconstrained consumption market integrating the foreign currency regulations. . The time 
use (queuing) was another  equilibrium factor with informal sharing of work time between 
private and enterprise use. The labor market was constrained on the demand side by quasi 
permanent workforce shortage for employers  generating various forms of formal and 
informal adjustments like  multi-employment situations for employees. The peculiar 
characteristics of informal markets under centrally planned Polish economy are described in 
detail in Starzec 1983, and explained in the frame of a disequilibrium model in  Charemza 
(1982, 1990). 
The transition from centrally planned to the market economy changed the character 
and nature of disequilibria and constraints generating the new forms of formal-informal 
duality in economy. Vanishing shortages on good and services markets are replaced by the 
new disequilibria especially on labor market with appearing unemployment with specific  
social protection counterpart (contribution and benefits). At the same time the liberalization 
of the economy, growing rapidly private sector was accompanied by large scale  public 
finance reforms. The most important ones  were the introduction of the progressive income 
tax,  of the Value Added Tax (VAT), the individualization of social contributions and the old 
age pension reform. These changes created the new conditions for informal economy 
development, similar to those observed in traditional market economies. The opening of 
borders expanded considerably the informal international commerce activities (smuggling) 
and informal work migration. (see CASE, 2007). Thus, the most important effect of the  
transition from administrated economy of shortage to market economy with state regulation 
was  a shift from consumption constrained to employment constrained situations with 
corresponding informal market behaviors. The transformation of  informal markets was 
similar in several central European countries (Hungary , Czech Republic, Slovakia,  but they 
differ for Russia (Kurkchiyan, Marina. 2000) and  the former Soviet Union Republics  where 
both pre-transition and post transition situations are institutionally and  politically  more 
specific  and extremely heterogeneous (for Georgia for example see Bernabè, Stampini 
(2008)).  The Polish particularity  when compared to other Central European countries is 
related to the   peculiar situation of agricultural sector both before and during the transition. 
Under centrally planned economy Poland is characterized by a relatively open economy and 
the presence of a very large (90%) private sector in agriculture. During the transition period 
agriculture became  potentially  the most important  part of informal labour market  because 
of its  high unemployment situation (GUS 1996) and  the properties of the tax regime (lump 
sum taxation)  . 
Several sources of information must often be combined to obtain the most plausible 
image of the informal market reality. The macroeconomic evaluation methods try to correct 
the PIB aggregates for unregistered activities (Schneider 2007) whereas microeconomic 
approaches try to correct the individual income and expenditure distribution  for the informal 
markets participation effects. Moreover, the microeconomic approach is essentially oriented 
to the question of cost-benefit utility maximation problem of tax evasion (Cowell,1985,1990) 
and more generally to the individual’s economic and social reasons to participate in informal 
markets.  
The classic micro-economic question of the trade off between participating on the 
formal or informal labour markets was formalized by Fortin, Lacroix (1992) in a structural 
model maximizing the individual’s expected utility. However, the hidden nature and resulting  
lack of specific individual information makes very complex the estimation of a structural 
model. Most of econometric applications use its reduced form. 
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 Another difficulty is taking into account the risks of control and penalty costs or 
moral stigma evaluation for informal market participants in presence of active policies against 
underground activities. Fortin et al, 2004 discussed this problem and proposed an 
econometric model for informal market participation in this context. 
 Similarly the role of social interactions (Mansky, 2000), network  effects or 
neighborhood effects ((Fortin et al 2002)  on the  informal activities are  discussed in the 
literature but treated with many difficulties in  empirical research because of identification 
problems and the lack of the specific data. More recent work on social interactions’ role uses 
experimental data  (Fortin et al 2007) with somewhat debatable empirical results because they 
are  based on artificially composed groups of tax payers,  and  are difficult to extrapolate to 
the entire population. 
Our approach is based on the same micro-economic background analyzing the causes 
and interactions between different informal behaviours.  We analyse the informal  market 
participation decisions taking the advantage of an original survey specifically devoted to 
informal activities study conducted in Poland in 1995 during the transition period (see 
GUS,1996). In particular we analyse  the differences and links between various types of 
underground activities (buying, hiring and working) and discuss the existence of network 
effects (Section 1). Then we  propose an original method to investigate the links between the 
consumption behaviour and informal market participation based on the statistically matched 
data on consumption and on informal activities (Section 2). This analysis allows the 
identification of the specific consumption patterns of informal market participants. 
 
  
1.1 General characteristics of informal markets participation in Poland in 1995 2  
 
Informal work  
 
 In transition context the central question was analyzing informal work patterns in 
Poland as a dysfunction of the labor market, but also as a collateral phenomenon of 
unemployment and tax evasion. How do the people explain the reasons of participating in the 
informal labour  market? (table1). In 1995 the most of them (63%) indicate insufficient 
incomes or inability to find an official job (39%). Too high taxes were responsible for almost 
25% of moonlighters but only 10% were fearing to loose their means tested benefits if  
working on official market. Generally the man-woman distribution of responses on these 
questions is similar except from the one indicating the monetary advantage of working 
without contract - more frequent for women that for men. Younger and higher educated 
people more frequently give the tax evasion reason for working without formal contract  than 
the others who stress more the need for the extra incomes. Generally the income constraint 
appears as a main reason for moonlighting. 
 
The most frequent types of hidden activities are agriculture and gardening (25%), 
construction and installation (14.2%), car repairs and transport (12%) and so-called 
neighborhood services  (13%). The majority of moonlighters is in the age between 25 and 44 
(52%) with the highest proportion for this age group. The participation in informal labor 
market is the fact of all education groups, but the most frequently concerns people with 
vocational and primary school level (38%). 
Almost all socio-demographic groups are concerned by the informal work. However 
the hidden economy activities  are observed  more frequently among low skilled workers and  
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jobs which do not need a high qualications. It seems that  the large part of these activities is 
caused by the insufficient income and the dysfunctions of the official labor markets. Similarly 
hiring moonlighters looks like  a research of low cost labor  force, a kind of golden 
opportunity rather than a systematic choice for  the tax evasion. As it was stressed by 
(Kalaska, Witkowski, 1996), the informal work “is a form of survival of both employers and a 
part of employees who have no chances on the official market”  
 
In the post- transition period (2004) a similar study (GUS, 2005) showed relatively  
few  changes in attitudes and opinions  towards the informal activities.However, the shift 
from transition to post transition period  weakened significantly the economic constraint and  
strengthened the tax burden effect  as reasons of informal labour market participation. Indeed, 
in 2004 the lack of alternative than informal work and heavy tax burden were declared more 
often in 1995 than in 2004 as causes for taking up an informal work  whereas insufficient 
incomes became less frequent motivation  of informal activities in 2004 than in 1995. 
However their respective ranks  among  main motivations to participate in informal labor 
market remained the same. Morever, the observed differences  in opinions since 1995 
remained almost unchanged in 2004 whatever the sex, age, education group or the locality.    
 
 Informal markets participation 
 
The analysis of informal labor market participation can be enlarged to the other 
underground activities - buying and hiring, following the explicit responses in the available 
survey. We define the “informal market participation”  as a positive  response to  anyone out 
of three informal activities (working, buying, or hiring).. 
We consider that a household    participates in parallel activities if at least one of its 
members does it. In table 2 we present some general statistics about household’s participation 
in the different types of underground activities. Almost 22% households are present on at 
least one of informal markets by one of its members, 15% are buying, 7.4% working and 6.8 
hiring.  
Almost 18% of households were present on the informal labour market. About 1,6% 
of households  combine both  working and hiring, 2.5% are buying and working and more 
than 5% are buying and hiring informally. This interdependence of certain informal activities 
will be discussed later in this section. 
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Table 1 
Opinions on the reasons for taking the unregistered employment in 1995 (as % of the total)*. 
*several responses possible 
Source: GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995), Kalaska, Witkowski, 1996. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Frequencies of different forms of informal economy participation 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
      Nature of informal activities           Nb obs     Mean   Std Dev 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--Households 
 
Buying on informal markets   10390     0.154     0.361 
Working on informal markets  10390     0.074     0.262 
Hiring on informal markets   10390     0.068     0.252 
          Participating (at least one out of three)         10390     0.217     0.412 
 
Working or hiring informal markets          10390     0.179      0.383 
Working and hiring on informal markets     10390     0.016     0.125 
Buying and working  on informal markets   10390  0.025     0.157                     
Buying and hiring on informal markets        10390  0.053    0.224 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995) 
 
 
Specification Total Men Women  Urban Rural 
Insufficient incomes 63.0 61.6 64.2 63.1 62.7 
Inability to find an official 
Job 
38.9 38.6 39.3 35.6 44.6 
Higher incomes without a 
Contract 
16.2 18.1 14.5 17.2 14.6 
Family or personal Situation 8.7 6.7 10.4 8.9 8.2 
Too high taxes 24.2 26.8 21.8 26.0 21.1 
High social security 
Contribution 
16.0 17 2 15.0. 16.8 14.7 
Unwillingness to have a 
Permanent job (flexibility) 
1.3 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.5 
Fear to lose certain benefits 10.3   10.7 10.0 10.9 9.3 
Other 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1 
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 Socio-economic profiles and participation probabilities 
 
The definition of participation here is the declared by any person in the household any 
informal activity (buying, working, hiring) permanently or occasionally.. We consider, that 
the household’s situation and needs determine the demand on informal market goods, services  
and activities. Another hypothesis going in the same sense is to consider that one informal 
activity is inducing another one , which can be done by the same or any other person - 
member of the same household. 
 
  Overall household’s participation probability increases  with the number of children, it 
is higher in the countryside in families of farmers or double active working in the farm. 
Household’s head unemployment is a strong factor increasing this probability while  age is 
reducing  it. University level of education increases considerably and significantly the 
participation probability, while other education categories have no significant impact 
(Appendix table B1). 
The socio-economic profiles of participants change if  various  types of informal 
activities (working, buying, hiring) are taken into account (see Appendix table B1). 
a. As expected, unemployment increases significantly the probability of not registered 
work, but reduces those of  buying on informal market. 
b. Male household’s head has higher than female probability to work or hire without 
formal contract, but lower to buy on the informal market.  
c. Living in a area with lower than country’s average unemployment is related to the 
higher  probability to hire and lower probability  to work informally (which seems 
natural), whereas in the case of areas  characterized  by a higher than country’s average  
unemployment, the probability to work informally is significant and higher than in the 
aeras  with average   unemployment.  
d. There is no significant difference in the  probability to participate in any informal 
activity with respect to the age, except from people above 60 for whom the informal work 
is significantly lower than for others. This is related very probably to the generally lower 
participation in  the labour market.  
e. The probability of participation do not vary for inhabitants of cities and towns except 
from hiring informally  which rises significantly when the size of agglomeration is 
decreasing. However, living in the countryside rises very significantly the chances to 
participate in all informal activities. 
f.  Similarly farmers or double active (farmers and wage earners) have higher and 
significant probability to participate in all informal activities than wage earners. The self 
employed will only work informally with higher probability, but not to buy or hire. 
g.  The education level,  has a small influence on participation behavior: high school 
education reduces the probability to work and university education increases the 
probability to buy on the informal markets.  
h. The family situation has a small impact on informal activities - the participation rises 
with the number of children with the most significant outcomes for informal work . 
Buying and hiring “on black” is more probable for families with 3 children than for 
smaller ones. 
  
Generally it appears that it is in the rural environment, where  the probability  of all kind 
of informal activities is the highest.. Work without a formal contract is the most frequent in 
the case of unemployment  or in the areas with relatively high unemployment. Informal hiring 
activities  are more probable in cities but also among families with several children.  The high 
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probability  of  informal buying is related to high  household head’s education and the 
presence of  a  large family.  
Thus, these relationships with respect to the informal activities appear to depend on the 
income or labour market situation , the rural or urban environment, but are age independent  
except from the “natural” labour supply  decrease for the elderly.  
          
 
Are  Buying, working and hiring  on informal markets interdependent?  
 
 Following  Fortin et al, 2002, we question the existence of interdependence between 
various informal activities enlarging the analysis to the three types informal market activities: 
working, buying and hiring without formal contract in the context of Polish transition 
economy. 
.We  test this hypothesis using a  recursive bivariate probit model of the probability to buy 
goods and services informally  combined  with  other informal activities ( to work or to hire 
without formal contract)  by including   them as regressors. in the buying equation. We 
estimate three models combining (a) working and buying, (b) hiring and bying, (c) working 
or hiring and buying using seemingly unrelated regression allowing for residuals’ correlation. 
  In order to take into account the possible  endogeneity of dependent  variables used as 
regressors  we use the following estimation procedure. Firstly, we include the regional 
unemployment variables only in the equation of probability to work (or hire) supposing that 
there is few interdependence between them  and the informal buying. Secondly, we 
instrument the dependent variable  of the first equation (probability to work, to hire and  to 
buy or hire) by simple probit method and put the instrumented value as a regressor  into the 
buying equation. 
 
The general specification of estimated models is the following system: 
 ŷ1= f1(x1,x2,...xk) 
 
y2= ŷ1 +  f2(x1,x2,...xk-i) 
 
Where ŷ1,y2 dependent variables of informal activity probabilities , where ^ means 
instrumented value 
x1-xk exogenous, socio-demographic and economic  determinants,  
xk - xk-i  excluded exogenous variables  
 
The summary results for three estimated models in terms of marginal effects are presented  in 
the table 3. The full  results   are  in  Appendix B tables  B2-B4.. 
- (1) The marginal  effect of working on informal market i.e the increase in 
probability to buy while working informally probability shifts from 0 to 1 is 0.45 . 
More generally, the shift in probability to  participate in informal labour market 
(working or hiring) from 0 to 1  increases the probability to buy by 0.48. These 
effects are particularly high, when compared with the average participation on 
informal  consumption market of  0.15.    
- (2) The closest relationship is observed between hiring and buying informally. The 
obtained marginal effect (0.50) means that hiring informally increases the 
probability to buy informally by 50 percent . 
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The estimated high marginal effects  confirm the social network  or neigburhood effects  
related with an easier access to different informal activities for those which are  already 
present on at least one of informal markets. Moreover  the results show a strong  
interdependence among  various informal activities suggesting that participating in any of 
them can be a significant determinant  explaining households’ behavior.  
 
We develop this conclusion in the next section considering the influence of the informal 
market  participation on the households consumption behavior on the regular markets.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Probability of buying  working  and hiring on informal markets           
Recursive bivariate probit model  
 marginal effects* 
 
variable dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx 
 Work+buy 
Hire+bu
y Hire or work+buy 
Working on informal markets 
(instrumented) 0,451* 0,499* 0,484* 
Household’s head 
Unemployed -0,106 -0,044* -0,095* 
Inactive -0,075* -0,019 -0,026* 
Household’s head age less 
than 30 0,030* 0,018 0,029* 
Household’s head age  30 - 39 0,033* 0,013 0,032* 
Household’s head age 40 - 60 0,091* 0,022 0,070* 
University level education 0,068* 0,056* 0,096* 
High school level education 0,030 0,015 0,053* 
Primary school level education 0,019 0,010 0,026 
Farmers 0,179* -0,010 0,022 
Double active (farmers+wage 
earners) 0,076* -0,009 0,013 
Pensioneers 0,057* 0,022* 0,029* 
Self employed -0,009  -0,031 
One child -0,003 0,004 -0,013 
Two children -0,014 -0,006 -0,030* 
Three children or more -0,029* 0,003 -0,041* 
• Significant at 90% level 
• *See appendix B Tables B2-B4 for detailed estimation results  
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995) 
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2. Participation to Informal Market s and Household  Expenditures on Regular Markets 
 
We conclude from section 2 that the household’s participation to the informal labour 
market may create a positive network effect on hiring labour services or purchasing goods on 
the black markets, both expenditures which may influence regular consumption because of 
substitution between regular and informal expenditures.Thus, both modes of participating to 
informal institutions may change the expenditures on regular markets. Indeed, if informal 
activities influence regular consumption, the estimation of regular demand as they are 
recorded in the HouseholdBudgets surveys may be biased whenever these informal activities 
are not taken into account. Moreover, considering them as potential explanatory variables 
may reduce part of the endogeneity biases which appear in cross-section estimations, and 
which are caused by the existence of permanent latent (unobserved) variables (see Gardes et 
al., 2005, for the biases of income elasticities computed on cross-sections). We try to deepen 
this question by proposing an approach combining the microeconomic consumption behavior 
analysis based on the typical household budget data with the information on the participation 
in informal markets contained in the Labour Force survey: integrating an index of unofficial 
activities in the equation for regular consumption may greatly improve cross-section estimates 
of all variables which are correlated, in the cross-section dimension, to these unofficial 
activities. The result would be cross-section estimates closer to time-series, which would 
solve the puzzle discussed in Gardes et al (2005).  
 
In order to test for this dependency, we have imputed the probability to participate to 
informal markets for each household in the Family Expenditures surveys. For this analysis we 
use two statistically matched surveys: (i)the extended Labor Force Survey 1995 (ELFS 1995) 
containing  specific  information on informal economy participation  (used in the previous 
section) and (ii) the Household Budget Survey  (HBS 1995) with the associated four-years 
panel data (1993-1996) (see Appendix 2 for more  details). First, demand systems are 
estimated on both time series (panel) and cross section data including the information on the 
participation on informal markets. Second, the income elasticities are compared between sub-
populations with different participation probabilities. This comparison can indicate to what 
extent the use of informal markets is an economic constraint rather than a “golden 
opportunity” allowing simply to buy goods and services at lower price level.  
 
2.1. Specification, econometric methodology and data base construction 
  
The first step consists in setting up an appropriate data base. We use a regression 
based matching procedure to impute the informal market participation probabilities from 
ELFS 1995 into the 1994-96 Panel of Household  Budget Surveys and the 1995 Household 
Budget Survey (HBS). The estimated model of participation in informal economy based  on 
the 1995 ELFS Survey (see section 1 and table B1 in the Appendix B), is  applied to predict 
the participation probabilities of each household in the panel and the survey (HBS) using 
similar households’ characteristics. These predicted probabilities are added as explanatory 
variables in the demand systems analysis. Our hypothesis is that the households  participating 
and non-participating in informal markets  may behave differently, with respect to their socio-
economic characteristics, when facing a change in income, relative prices or other 
determinants of their consumption. We test this hypothesis estimating an Almost Ideal 
Demand System and a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QAIDS) on panel and cross-
section expenditure data with the imputed information on informal market participation. The 
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estimation of the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System QAIDS has been made using the 
convergence algorithm proposed by Banks et al. (1997): 
 
For the linear Almost Ideal specification we have  
         
wiht = αi +π  i part + Σj γij ln pjt + βi ln [mht/a(pt)] +  Zht.δi + uiht     (2.1a) 
 
 
For the Quadratic specification        (2.1b) 
 
wiht = αi + π i part + Σj γij ln pjt + βi ln [mht/a(pt)] + {[λi/b(pt)] ln [m/a(p)]}2 + Zht.δi + uiht,   
 
with:  ln a(pt) =  α0 + Σj αi ln pit + 0.5 ΣiΣj γij ln pit.ln pjt     and    b(pt) = Πi pitβi  
 
where wiht is the budget share for good i, individual h and period t, pit the price of good i, mht 
h’s total income in period t, part the imputed probability of all members of the household to 
participate to informal consumption or activity and Zht all other socio-economic variables. 
Because of the possible endogeneity due to measurement errors of the income variable, it is 
instrumented by the total expenditure, the household head’s age and its social category. 
 
As the estimated parameters αi, βi, γij enter non-linearly into the equation, a first step 
consists to estimate equation (2.1b) using a Stone price index a(pt) =   with  the 
average budget share of good i over individuals and period (that is, imposing α0 = γij = 0 and 
αi =  in the true price index a(pt)). Price elasticities can be corrected to take into account the 
difference between the exact price index a(pt) and the Stone index, as described by Pashardes 
(1990). In the second step, the βi estimated are used to compute b(pt). At each step, b(pt) is 
updated and the system is linear in parameters. This procedure ensures that the quadratic 
specification which is estimated corresponds to the integrable QAIDS system. 
 
Blundell and Robin (1999) proved the consistency and asymptotic efficiency of this 
iterative procedure compared to the maximum likelihood estimate. The estimation is made 
under the sole additivity hypothesis, as homogeneity is not accepted by the data except for 
clothing (note that the results are similar when homogeneity is constrained). The “between” 
and “within” parameters are estimated by pooling the three surveys with quarter and period 
dummies to take into account all institutional changes. The convergence process is rather low, 
b(p) converging at the 75th iteration.  
 
2.2.  The Effect of Informal Markets Participation on the Consumption Behavior  
 
 The Almost IdealDS model (2.1a) is estimated on the 1995 Polish  Household Budget 
Survey for 10 aggregated consumption items considered as a demand system with budget 
constraint (Table 4). Then, a panel sample covering the period 1994-1996 is used for system 
estimation (Apendix B, table B5).The final system estimation is performed using the same 
panel sample applying the quadratic version of the model (QAIDS) (Appendix B, table B6), 
resulting in four conclusions:  
(a) The estimated coefficients of the probability to participation to the informal economy are 
very close for separate, equation by equation, demand system and between transformed data 
estimates, except for the item Culture and Education – traditionally a poorly defined 
category. For six groups of commodities out of eleven, the estimated probability to participate 
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in the black market has a significant effect on regular expenditures in all types of estimation . 
The effect is clearly positive for Food, Alcohol and Tobacco, Transport and Communication 
with values from 10 to 30% of the budget share at the average probability of 0.3 (Table 4). 
The coefficient is negative for all other groups, especially for three services: Health, 
Education and Cultural expenditures (note that, under the additivity restriction, the 
coefficients for all groups sum up to 0). Such a negative effect of participation to the informal 
economy corresponds to a substitution between informal and regular expenditures: 
expenditures for goods or services of informal markets substitute for official expenditures. 
This substitution may be important for the three services which have the larger negative 
coefficients. A positive effect can be due to the influence of latent variables both on 
participation to informal markets and on the regular expenditures. Suppose for instance that 
the household is relatively poor in its reference population. This relative position tends to 
increase its food expenditures, compared to the normal effect of its current income (see 
Gardes, 2007, for the theory and an empirical analysis of this relative income effect). On the 
other hand, relative poverty increases the tendency to participate to the informal markets, so 
that a positive relationship appears between these two variables3. Therefore, income effects 
computed independently of its relative income position, would under-estimate its food 
consumption and artificially create a positive effect of this probability to participate. 
Conversely, luxury goods such as culture or health expenditures may be over-estimated. In a 
sense, the inclusion of this probability among the determinants of households expenditure 
control for relative income effects. It would be important to take into account both variable, 
relative income and black market participation, but this require to model explicitly the relative 
income effects, a difficult task. 
                                                     
3 The income from the informal labor market can also increase the consumption in excess of the part explained 
by official income declared by the household, whenever the household does not include in its declaration its 
unofficial income, but the specification on the instrumented total expenditure theoretically exclude such an 
under-estimation. 
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Table 4 
AIDS cross-section   estimates of the change in budget shares  
 according to the probability of participation in informal economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.Student (robust) statistics in parenthesis 
2.Income instrumented by total expenditure and  socio-demographic variables. 
3.Income elasticities computed at the average level of budget share 
source: Computed from GUS  Household Budget Survey  (1995) 
Number of observation 31857 
 
 
(b) The comparison of the total expenditure elasticities (estimated by QAIDS) for 
two sub-populations: participating or non participating households, is given in the Table 5 . 
Half of the commodity groups have different time-series elasticities for the two sub-
populations, but the order between the elasticities of the participating or not participating 
households are not the same for cross-section and time-series elasticities. Moreover, those 
commodities which are characterized by a large positive influence of participation (estimated 
in the constant) do not have larger income elasticity (in the within dimension) in the 
participating population. Perhaps the three types of participation have not similar effects as 
concerns the income elasticity.  
 
 
 
Expenditure groups Income 
elasticity 
participation 
probability 
average 
budget share 
    
Food 0.64723 0.181289 0.448 
  (5.028 )  
Alcohol and tobacco 0.65111 0.011839 0.034 
  (1.015)  
Clothing 1.49340 -0.045741 0.064 
  (-2.177)  
Dwelling  (charges) 0.87026 -0.008299 0.184 
  (-0.241)  
Dwelling (equipment) 2.19828 0.018621 0.032 
  (1.008 )  
Health 1.08289 -0.087720 0.042 
  (-5.857)  
Hygiene 0.97142 -0.004439 0.034 
  ( -0.642)  
Education 0.91242 -0.066810 0.018 
  ( -7.172)  
Culture 1.73049 -0.093797 0.047 
  (-5.255 )  
Transport and  communication. 1.86568 0.084119 0.078 
  (0.606)  
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Table 5 
 Income Elasticity according to the Household’s Participation to the Informal Economy 
 
 Participating>Non-
Participating 
Participating<Non-
Participating 
Cross-section Elasticity Dwellings (charges) Clothing, Dwelling 
(equipment) 
 
Time-series Elasticity Clothing, Transport and 
Communication 
Food, Miscellaneous 
Source: Computed from GUS  Household Budget panel  (1994-1995) (4809 observation per year    
 
  The explanation for the order between time-series elasticities –theoretically unbiased 
by the existence of permanent latent variables (which often bias the cross-section elasticities) 
cannot rely on relative income considerations: a continuous increase of households’ income 
may not provoke a substitution between unofficial and official commodities, thus no 
endogenous bias may appear in the time-series income elasticities. The order of these time-
series elasticities may perhaps be partly explained by a different consumption behavior of 
rural and non-rural households. It can be also observed that participating households have 
higher income-elasticities for commodities which are already highly elastic: clothing, 
dwelling charges, transport and communication, as if supplementary income from informal 
activities or savings due to smaller prices on black markets are principally spent on luxury 
groups of commodities. 
 
 Note that it is highly plausible that the different types of participation to the informal 
sector differs between the rich and the poor: the former may buy unofficial goods and hire 
employees in the informal sector, while the latter may also buy goods (but different types of 
commodities) and sell their work informally. So, it may be important to differentiate these 
three types of participation to analyze consumption patterns and the constraints faced by the 
population. 
 
(c)  Another interesting feature of these statistics lies in the revealed choice conditions  
through the computation of shadow prices corresponding to rationing constraints or the 
existence of non-monetary resources. Such hidden determinants have been proved to explain 
the frequent biases in cross-section elasticities, compared to time-series. Those shadow prices 
are defined by changing consumption, through prices effects, in exactly the same amount as 
the change which is attributed to some latent variable. They measure, in price terms, the 
influence of this unobserved latent variable. For instance, optimizing under a rationing 
constraint (or conditionally to a definite amount of time spent in the consumption activity) 
lowers the optimal expenditure for the constrained commodity in exactly the same amount as 
that which is driven, through some calibrated direct price elasticity, by a price increase of a 
certain value for this commodity (see Appendix in Gardes et al., 2005; details and a more 
general model can be found in Gardes, 2008). Table 6 presents these shadow prices for 
participating and non participating households. Shadow prices are negatively related to the 
household’s income when it does participate to the informal economy, while they are in the 
opposite positively related to income for the non-participating. This means that full prices 
(integrating these shadow prices) are greater for the poor among participating households, and 
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the reverse for the rich not participating, which may create an incentive for the poor to gain 
from their participation to informal markets. The analysis thus shows an important economic 
determinant of the participation to the informal economy, and explains why this participation 
is more frequent among poor households. 
 
Table 6 
Shadow prices for participating and non-participating households 
 
Commodity 
group 
Budget share Participating 
Households 
Non-
Participating 
Households 
Food 0.448 -2.45 -0.47 
Alcohol-
Tobacco 
0.034 -2.98 * 
Clothing 0.064 -0.64 0.99 
Dwelling 
(charges) 
0.184 0.63 0.09 
Dwelling 
(equipment) 
0.032 0.27 0.88 
Transport and 
Communication 
0.078 -0.004 0.26 
Health 0.076 0.19 -0.15 
Culture and 
education 
0.065 0.12 0.26 
Miscellaneous 0.019 0.68 -1.17 
Weighted Mean  -0.91 0.68 
Source: Computed from GUS  Household Budget panel  (1994-1995) (4809 observation per year)  
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Conclusion 
 
The use of the survey describing on the individual and household levels different types of 
informal activities (working, buying, hiring) makes possible to explore many new aspects of 
underground economy mechanisms. The characteristics of participants in informal markets 
differ when considering various types of underground activities but generally they are related 
with the constrained  employment. Firstly, the rural population appears as the main actor of 
informal markets, probably because of the income constraints and also,  because of the 
specificity of    the labor market  less developed in the countryside. Secondly the age and 
education level do not seem to influence the informal participation, which may show that this 
participation is more distributed all over the population than in other countries. Thirdly, the  
average regional unemployment rate is positively related to informal participation, even when 
the influence of the household regular activity has been already taken into account. It  may 
indicate the existence of a network effect:a larger supply of informal goods and services 
increasing the household’s exposure to informal activities, thus giving rise to a larger 
household’s participation. Last, bachelor are more active in the informal economy, while 
large families seem to be less prone to participate to informal markets than families with only 
one or two children: this asymmetric relationship may be simply due to the existence of very 
large families in rural areas, although location have been taken into account in the estimation. 
It is possible that some supplementary cost to participate to the informal economy appears for 
large families compared to smaller. 
The analysis of the characteristics of participants in informal markets thus confirms that  
working, buying and hiring on informal markets are mutually dependent. This is particularly 
the case of working and buying or hiring and  bying .through the “network effect” where any 
contact with underground economy can facilitate other entries We test the importance of these 
dependencies using a set of bivariate estimations. The increase in probability to buy while 
working informally probability shifts from 0 to 1 is 0.45 . More generally, the shift in 
probability to  participate in informal labour market (working or hiring) from 0 to 1  increases 
the probability to buy by 0.48. These effects are particularly high, when compared with the 
average participation on informal  consumption market of  0.15.  This confirm the interest in 
testing a structural model such as proposed by Fortin et al, 2002, in order to analyze the 
dependencies between various informal market participations and the potentially associated 
social stigma.  
We analyze the possible existence of this network effect also indirectly comparing the 
cross-section and time series differences of income elasticities observed for participating and 
non participating households. This analysis, based on a matching method combining a labor 
force and a family budget surveys, turns out to show that the household’s consumption 
behavior does depend, either negatively or positively according to the commodity group, on 
the informal market participation of the household. Moreover, the difference between the 
cross-section and the time-series estimates of the income effect is lowered by the presence of 
a participation probability among the explanatory variables, which is an important indication 
that this participation acts as a proxy for a lot of latent variables which cause the endogeneity 
biases on the cross-section estimates: it may be important to take into account an imputed 
participation rate in order to b e able to estimate income-elasticities on cross-section lowering 
the endogeneity bias. Third, shadow prices indicating the presence of constraints or non-
monetary resources (such as those proceeding from a hidden time constraint) seem to depend 
on the household’s participation to the informal economy: this indicates that those 
participating households may face different economic costs which explain their participation 
to the informal markets.  
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Réponses au rapporteur (1) 
 
1-3. La présentation de l’article a été modifié en développant l’introduction, la revue de la 
littérature et en homogénéisant les sources des données utilisée dans la partie descriptive (Seule 
l’unité d’observation « ménage » a été retenue et celle de l’individu -éliminée).  
Dans la partie introductive de la section 1, nous avons mis en perspective la situation de la 
Pologne par rapport à  d’autres pays de transition et rappelé la particularité de la transition 
concernant le marché informel. Nous avons aussi actualisé et élargie la bibliographie. 
  
Nous avons complété la présentation des données et  précisé  la méthode de  constitution des 
échantillons de travail. Les tableaux des statistiques descriptives ont été ajoutés en annexe. Nous 
avons expliqué les variables utilisées dans les régressions. 
 
Dans le modèle de participation nous avons sélectionnés parmi les variables  disponibles celles 
qui étaient susceptibles d’être significatives et communes au LFS (enquête emploi) et HBS 
(enquête budgets des ménages). Les revenus de ménages ne sont  pas renseignés dans le LFS. 
L’appariement statistique entre les deux enquêtes pour expliquer la probabilité de participation est 
une suggestions intéressante, mais c’est une autre façon de montrer  de ce qu’il a été fait dans la 
seconde section.  
 
4. Nous avons ajouté l’analyse des déterminants de la participation activité par activité dans le 
texte avec   renvoi au tableau dans l’annexe (tableau A3).  
  Nous avons renoncé à l’analyse dynamique (entre le 1995 et 1998) en considérant la période 
séparant les deux dates comme un peu courte. Le choix de l’année 1995 plutôt que 1998  a été 
guidé  par la meilleure qualité des réponses pour cette année constatée par  les auteurs de 
l’enquête (L’office stattistique  national GUS). Nous ne disposons pas de l’enquête 2004.  
Nous avons en revanche ajouté un commentaire sur l’évolution des opinions et les motivations de 
participation entre 1995 et 2004 en utilisant les sources publiées de l’enquête 2004.  
Nous avons fait le choix d’analyse au niveau de ménage parce que c’est une unité d’observation 
sur laquelle les deux sources statistiques utilisées  (enquête sur l’emploi et l’enquête de 
consommation) sont appariées. Notre hypothèse consiste à considérer  la situation du ménage en 
fonction de la probabilité de participation au marché informel de n’importe quel membre du foyer. 
 
5. Notre choix initial dans le papier a été d’analyser l’offre  et la demande du travail au noir et son 
impact éventuel sur la demande de consommation (biens et services). Conformement à la 
suggestion nous l’avons élargi dans la  version corrigée aux liens entre la consommation 
informelle et l’offre ou la demande du travail.    Dans ce contexte, plus encore que dans le cas 
précédent  le lien entre la consommation et la présence sur le marché du travail  semble naturel. 
D’autres liens possibles (l’embauche et le travail, ou  l’embauche et l’achat) sont intéressants en 
soi, mais sans suite dans la deuxième partie. Nous avons ajouté et commenté brièvement ces 
relations dans la partie descriptive (tab 2). 
 
6.Nous avons refait les estimations conformément aux suggestions en utilisant le probit bivarié 
(système à équations simultanées) pour tenir compte des effets de l’endogenéité. Nous avons élargi 
l’analyse aux relations entre le travail, l’embauche, et la  présence sur le marché du travail informel  
d’une part et l’achat sur le marché informel d’autre part.  Cette estimation a bien montré le lien 
significatif entre le travail et achat au noir et d’une manière plus générale entre l’achat et 
participation au marché informel du travail (l’offre et la demande du travail informel) ainsi que l’effet 
significatif d’endogéneité.  
 
6. Le lien entre les deux sections… 
 
 
9. La probabilité de participation utilisée dans la 2ème section est une prédiction de la participation 
dans l’enquête de consommation (HBS) à partir du modèle estimé avec  l’enquête emploi (ELFS),  
conditionnellement aux caractéristiques de ménages. De ce fait cette variable ne devrait plus être 
endogène et le problème ne se pose pas. En revanche la  variable revenu est effectivement 
instrumentée   par la dépense totale, catégorie socio- professionnel  et age du chef de ménage. 
Nous avons introduit un bref commentaire dans le texte. 
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10  La description de la  constitution de l’échantillon a été complétée dans l’Annexe  A. 
      
11. Variabilité du panel 
 
12 methodologie du panel justifier 
13  L’anglais a été revu  
 
 
Remarques secondaires 
 
14. Bibliografie a été revue et complétée. 
15. C’est vrai qu’il s’agit dans la plupart des cas des contraintes nouvelles et c’est le sens de la 
deuxième section. En revanche il difficile l’agriculture était devenu une agriculture de subsistance 
beaucoup plus pendant la transition par rapport à la situation d’avant, où le niveau de vie moyen à 
la campagne a été supérieur au niveau de vie des ouvriers et des employés dans les villes. Les 
agriculteurs ont été les grands perdants de la transition.  
16. En effet 1994-1996 est une période de transition, nous avons éliminé du texte les passages 
ambigus. 
17. Nous avons changé le titre : The informal activities and consumption of Polish households 
during the transition. 
18. Nous utilisons alternativement activités informelles et marchés informels sans faire la 
référence à l’ampleur macroéconomique de la question. 
 19.Les raisons de participation sont différentes selon la catégorie de ménages, et  résultent à la 
fois des contraintes et des effets d’aubaine. La section 2 apporte les éléments de réponses en 
utilisant la notion de prix virtuels. 
 
20. Effet miltiplicateur après la transition ? 
 
21. Il a l’analyse en terme des prix virtuels qui traduit à la fois les effets de contraintes et des 
ressources non monétaires (dans la section 2). 
 
22. On utilise également d’autres variables de LFS, que celles du volet « travail informel). 
Nous avons renoncé à l’analyse dynamique (entre le 1995 et 1998) en considérant la période 
séparant les deux dates comme un peu courte. Le choix de l’année 1995 plutôt que 1998  a été 
guidé  par la meilleure qualité des réponses pour cette année constatée par  les auteurs de 
l’enquête (L’office statistique  national GUS). Nous ne disposons pas de l’enquête 2004.  
 
23. Nous avons regroupé les informations sur les sources utilisées dans l’annexe A (avec renvois 
à partir de la première et deuxième section)    et nous avons détaillé la construction de la base de 
données spécifique utilisée dans la section 2 dans l’introduction à cette section. 
 
24. Effectivement, par choix nous n’avons pas fait une analyse détaillée des activités informelles. 
Cela avait été fait dans les publications citées (GUS 1996 par exemple). Notre objectif principale a 
été seulement  de distinguer entre les ménages avec et sans activités informelles et analyser les 
liens entre différentes formes de ces activités. La question de saisonnalité et du cumul avec du 
travail formel aurait été abordée si on avait  voulu  valoriser le travail informel et le comparer avec 
l’apport monétaire du travail officiel. En revanche les disparités régionales on été abordés par 
l’introduction parmi les facteurs explicatifs la participation à l’activité informelle le taux de chômage 
locale. Par ailleurs les régions géographiques ne sont pas vraiment traitées  à cause des limites 
des statistiques officielles sinon par un regroupement souvent imprécis des unités administratives 
(voïvodie, powiat…). 
 
25. Nous avons limité l’analyse au seul niveau  « ménages ». Par souci de cohérence, nous 
avons éliminé quelques passages avec des références aux données individuelles. 
L’échantillon utilisé compte 10 390 ménages. Il a été constitué à partir des fichiers individuels 
hommes, femmes en utilisant l’identifiant « ménages » . Le nombre d’observations utilisées a été 
ensuite légèrement réduit à cause des valeurs manquantes ou incohérences. 
 26. La date de l’enquête a été corrigée. 
 
27. Ces statistiques ont été intégrées dans le tableau dans le texte. 
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28. …………….. 
 
29. La probabilité de participation au marché informel  a été imputée à partir de l’enquête ELFS 
1995 à l’enquête HBS 1995. Le panel HBS contient les ménages de cette même  enquête HBS 
1995, qui sont présent également dans les enquêtes 1994 et 1996. Les statistiques descriptives 
ont été ajoutées dans l’annexe A. 
 
30. 
 
31 ……….. 
 
32  On a ajouté dans la conclusion… 
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    Réponses au rapporteur (2) 
 
Nous avons amélioré la présentation des données utilisées, de la méthode économétrique  et nous 
avons restructuré l’ensemble de l’article. 
 
0. Nous avons élargie la discussion et revue de la littérature sur la question du marché 
informel et particulièrement dans le contexte de la transition. 
Nous avons mieux exposé la question de la demande du travail au noir en la distinguant 
explicitement dans les statistiques descriptives et dans  l’approche économétrique. 
Nous n’avons pas traité la question de l’opprobre social associé au recours au marché noir 
faute d’information suffisante. Une longue tradition de coexistence des activités informelles et 
formelles fait que l’opprobre et sans doute faible surtout en ce qui concerne le travail au noir. 
Souvent imposé par l’employeur, le travail au noir n’est pas perçu comme un délit par les 
travailleurs. Nous discutons brièvement cette question dans la première partie de la  section 1.  
On  ne répond pas à la problèmatique… 
 
1.Les informations sur les sources de données utilisées ont été regroupé dans l’annexe A avec des 
statistiques descriptives. 
Les statistiques présentées dans le papier se réfère au ménage comme unité d’observations. Par 
souci de cohérence les statistiques au niveau individuel ont été éliminées du papier. Les données 
sur les activités informelles  proviennent  de l’enquête  sur les forces de travail (LFS) couvrant 
l’année 1995. 
Les statistiques concernant différents types d’activités informelles ont été complétées et se trouvent 
dans le tableau 2. 
 
1. Nous avons refait les estimations conformément aux suggestions en utilisant le probit 
bivarié (système à équations simultanées) pour tenir compte des effets de l’endogenéité. 
Nous avons élargi l’analyse aux relations entre le travail, l’embauche, et la  présence sur le 
marché du travail informel  d’une part et l’achat sur le marché informel d’autre part.  Cette 
estimation a bien montré le lien significatif entre le travail et achat au noir et d’une manière 
plus générale entre l’achat et participation au marché informel du travail (l’offre et la 
demande du travail informel). 
2. Nous avons précisé la spécification du modèle utlisé dana la section 2 
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APPENDIX  A 
 
Data sources 
 
 
Unregistered economy survey ( Extended Labor Force Survey  (ELFS), GUS 1995)  
 
The new phenomenon of informal employment as collateral consequence of appearing and 
increasing dramatically unemployment was the main motivation for a special study conducted 
by Polish Statistical Office (GUS) in 1995. One of the most important points of the interest 
was the probable overestimation of the formal unemployment scale by evaluating the number 
of formally unemployed working in the unregistered activities induced both by tax evasion in 
the new private sector and by possible combining of the unemployment benefit with informal 
work. A large scale survey was launched with questions on hidden markets activities as a part 
of regular Labor Force Survey (LFS). LFS is household based survey. The ordinary dwellings 
are selected in two step sampling method. The working status questions apply to households 
members aged 15 and more. A specific questionnaire was elaborated and presented to the half 
of households selected for the quarterly LFS. A principle was adopted to use for this study the 
sub sample of persons finishing their cooperation with GUS after having participated in three 
consecutive waves of LFS. In total over 11000 households took part in the study and the 
information about 25.6 thousand persons living in was collected. Only 546 persons refused to 
take part in the survey. The survey was performed in August 1995. 
Main features of the hidden economy  survey: 
-Nation wide character: thanks to the modular character of the survey matched with 
LFS study all information is representative for the whole population and applying appropriate 
weights national scale estimates can be obtained.      
 -Common core variables with LFS study: in addition to specifically “hidden market” 
questions all socio-economic information on household  is available from LFS study. 
 -Demand-supply side of the phenomenon: information was collected on both  the 
demand for informal work and supply of the labor in the hidden economy asking 
corresponding questions to workers and persons running a private business. 
-Informal work characteristics: the distinction was made between persons working 
only in the hidden sector and combining formal and hidden one. 
-Different types of informal jobs were distinguished 
Detailed characteristics of types of activities in informal sector are given: hidden market 
consumption characteristics, reasons of taking informal job incomes and expenditures on 
hidden markets. 
 
Table A1  
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Household’s head Unemployed 10390 .0383061 .1919434 
Household’s head Working 10390 .360924 .4802916 
Household’s head Man 10390 .6842156 .4648499 
Household’s head Woman 10390 .3157844 .4648499 
Department  unemployment below 
the national average. 10390 .4475457 .4972649 
Department with average 
unemployment 10390 .2980751 .4574347 
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Department with unemployment 
above the national average 10390 .240231 .4272442 
Household’s head age less than 30 10390 .0787295 .2693291 
Household’s head age  30 - 39 10390 .2102021 .4074717 
Household’s head age 40 - 60 10390 .4159769 .4929133 
Household’s head age more than 60 10390 .2950914 .4561058 
City  > 100000 inhabitants 10390 .2963426 .4566659 
City  20000-99999 inhabitants 10390 .2056785 .404216 
City below 2000 -19999 inhabitants 10390 .125794 .331633 
Countryside 10390 .3721848 .4834106 
University level education 10390 .114052 .3178897 
High school level education 10390 .2454283 .4303616 
Primary school level education 10390 .5891242 .4920164 
No diploma 10390 .0513956 .2208139 
Wage earners 10390 .453513 .4978582 
Farmers 10390 .0897016 .2857676 
Double active (farmers+workers) 10390 .0459095 .209299 
Pensioneers 10390 .3637151 .4810912 
Self employed 10390 .0149182 .1212314 
no children 10390 .1663138 .37238 
One child 10390 .4366699 .4959969 
Two children 10390 .2142445 .4103169 
Three children or more 10390 .1827719 .386498 
Source: Extended Labor Force Survey  (ELFS), GUS 1995) 
 
 
 
The Polish Household Budget Surveys (HBS) and Panels  
 
 
Household budget surveys have been conducted in Poland for many years. In the analyzed 
period, the annual total sample size was about 30 000 thousand households, which represent 
approximately 0.3% of all households in Poland. The data were collected by a rotation 
method on a quarterly basis. The master sample consists of households and persons living in 
randomly selected dwellings. To generate it, a two stage, and in the second stage, two phase 
sampling procedure was used. The full description of the master sample generating procedure 
is given by Kordos et al. (1991). 
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 Master samples for each year contain data from four different sub-samples. Two sub-
samples started to be surveyed in 1986 ( 1992,1996) and ended the four years survey period in 
1990 (1996, 2000). They were replaced by new sub-samples in 1990 (1993, 2000). Another 
two sub-samples of the same size were started in 1987 (1993,1997) and followed through 
1990 (1996, 2000). 
 Over this four year periods on every annual sub-sample it is possible to identify 
households participating in the surveys during all four years. The checked and tested number 
of households is 3707 and 3052 for the earlier and later panels respectively. The available 
information is as detailed as for the cross-sectional surveys: all typical socio-economic 
characteristics of households and individuals are present, as well as details on income and 
expenditures. 
  The period 1987-1990 covered by the Polish panel is unusual even in Polish 
economic history. It represents the shift from a centrally planned, rationed economy (1987) to 
a relatively unconstrained fully liberal market economy (1990). Thus, the transitory years 
1988 and 1989 produced a period of a very high inflation and a mixture of free-market, 
shadow and administrated economy. The 1993-1996 panel reflects the main transition period , 
the 1997-2000 one  corresponds to the post transition high economic growth period with 
relatively low inflation, decreasing unemployment and generally improved socio-economic 
situation in the context of almost totally liberalized economy. 
In our estimations we use both a three year 1994-1996  periodof the 1993-19964 panel and 
1995 cross-section data containing the same variables. The number of households (our 
observation unit) in panel is 4809 and in 1995 survey about 32000. For descriptive statistics 
see table A2   
 
 
Table A2 
Averages and  of  variables used in consumption models (Household  Budget Survey (HBS) 1995) 
 
Variable  
number  of 
observation  Mean Std. Dev. 
total income 31857 1226,055 1163,859 
total expenditure| 31857 1120,649 909,641 
average head's age 31857 48,664 14,563 
heads age less than 30 31857 0,101 0,301 
head's age  30-40 31857 0,226 0,418 
head's age  40-60 31857 0,436 0,496 
head's age  more than 60 31857 0,237 0,425 
number of adults in households 31857 2,423 1,409 
number of children 31857 0,769 1,146 
city  250000 and more 31857 0,350 0,477 
city 50000 -250 000 | 31857 0,186 0,389 
city less than 50000 31857 0,126 0,331 
countryside (less than 2000) 31857 0,338 0,473 
workers| 31857 0,440 0,496 
farmers| 31857 0,065 0,247 
Double active (farmers+workers) 31857 0,053 0,223 
Pensioneers 31857 0,346 0,476 
Self employed 31857 0,137 0,296 
number of children=2 31857 0,141 0,348 
                                                     
4 The yaet 1993 was not used because of the absence of some variables in the version we had.  
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number of children=3 31857 0,166 0,372 
number of children=4 31857 0,059 0,235 
number of children more than 4 31857 0,026 0,160 
university and post secondary diploma 31857 0,119 0,324 
secondary school 31857 0,282 0,450 
primary school 31857 0,576 0,494 
no diploma 31857 0,023 0,151 
food budget share  31857 0,448 0,151 
alcohol and tobacco budget share 31857 0,034 0,044 
clothing budget share 31857 0,064 0,077 
dwellingt budget share 31857 0,184 0,131 
furniture budget share 31857 0,032 0,067 
health budget share 31857 0,042 0,056 
hygiene budget share 31857 0,034 0,025 
culture  budget share 31857 0,018 0,036 
education budget share 31857 0,047 0,068 
transport and communication bugdet share 31857 0,078 0,090 
miscelenoeus 31857 0,019 0,046 
Source: GUS, Household Budget Survey 1995
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Table B1 
Probability of participating (buying, working or hiring) on informal markets: 
Logistic function estimates (data on households) 
Summary table 
Variable Participating(1) Working(2) Buying(3) Hiring(4) 
INTERCEPT -0,429 0,227  0,211 0,369  
Household's head inactive -0,491 0,106  (ns) 0,097 0,186 
Household's head Unemployed 0,372 0,127 0,193 0,715 
Household's head Working reference reference reference reference 
Household's head Man -0,319 0,072 0,069(ns)  0,121 (ns) 
Household's head Woman reference reference reference reference 
Local unemployment ,below the national 
average -0,145 0,073 0,065 (ns) 0,105 
Local  unemployment with average 
unemployment reference reference reference reference 
Local  unemployment, above the national 
average 0,038 (ns) 0,079 0,075 (ns) 0,117 
Household's head age less than 30 reference reference reference reference 
Household's head age  30 - 39 -0,050 (ns) 0,114 0,119 (ns) 0,171 (ns) 
Household's head age 40 - 60 -0,113 (ns) 0,113 0,117 (ns) 0,168 (ns) 
Household's head age more than 60 -0,117 (ns) 0,147 0,137 0,203 
City  > 100000 inhabitants reference reference reference reference 
City  20000-99999 inhabitants -0,043 (ns) 0,098 (ns) 0,089 (ns) 0,257 
City below 2000 -19999 inhabitants 0,057 (ns) 0,109 (ns) 0,106 (ns) 0,256 
Countryside 0,422 0,089 0,081 0,217 
University level education -0,046 (ns) 0,193 0,160 0,292 (ns) 
High school level education -0,300  0,175 0,148 (ns) 0,234 
Primary school level education -0,124 (ns) 0,160 0,135 (ns) 0,204 
No diploma reference reference reference reference 
Wage earners reference reference reference reference 
Farmers 0,842 0,104  0,090 0,112 
Double active (farmers+wage earners) 0,328 0,135 (ns) 0,115 0,130 
Pensioneers 0,209 0,107 (ns) 0,101 0,159 
Self employed 0,560 0,219 0,298 (ns) n 
no children reference reference reference reference 
One child -0,762 0,136 0,112 (ns) 0,207 (ns) 
Two children -0,282 0,087 0,083 (ns) 0,119 (ns) 
Three children and more -0,152 0,089 0,087 (ns) 0,120 
1 Log likelihood = -5719.4899, LR chi2(21)= 670.58, Prob > chi2 =0.0000, Number of obs= 10390, 
2 Log likelihood = -3623.511, LR chi2(21) =497.20, Prob > chi2=0.0000, , Number of obs= 10390 
3Log likelihood = -4270.665, LR chi2(21) =422.64, Prob > chi2=0.0000, , Number of obs= 10390 
4 Log likelihood= -1841.554, LR chi2(20) =1675.70, Prob> chi2 =0.0000, Number of obs =10235 
(ns) not significant 
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995), 1039 obs 
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Table B2 
Probability of buying  and working on informal markets           
Recursive bivariate probit model  
 
| Coef. 
Robust 
St. Error z P>|z| 
     
Working equation   |     
  
Household’s head Unemployed 0,538 0,074 7,290 0,000 
Inactive -0,037 0,057 -0,650 0,519 
Local unemployment below the national average. -0,145 0,039 -3,750 0,000 
Local unemployment above the national average 0,067 0,043 1,560 0,118 
Household’s head age less than 30 -0,147 0,063 -2,320 0,021 
Household’s head age  30 - 39 -0,225 0,063 -3,590 0,000 
Household’s head age 40 - 60 -0,549 0,079 -6,980 0,000 
City  20000-99999 inhabitants -0,048 0,050 -0,950 0,344 
City below 20000 inhabitants 0,007 0,057 0,130 0,899 
Countryside 0,135 0,046 2,940 0,003 
University level education -0,363 0,099 -3,680 0,000 
High school level education -0,396 0,090 -4,420 0,000 
Primary school level education -0,202 0,082 -2,460 0,014 
Farmers 0,086 0,059 1,460 0,143 
Double active (farmers+wage earners) -0,023 0,075 -0,310 0,757 
Pensioneers 0,004 0,059 0,070 0,948 
Self employed 0,391 0,124 3,150 0,002 
One child 0,295 0,059 5,020 0,000 
Two children 0,403 0,065 6,240 0,000 
Three children or more 0,564 0,068 8,350 0,000 
constant -1,022 0,116 -8,840 0,000 
     
Buying equation            
  
Working on informal markets (instrumented) 1,963 0,578 3,400 0,001 
Household’s head Unemployed -0,656 0,141 -4,660 0,000 
Inactive -0,341 0,054 -6,280 0,000 
Household’s head age less than 30 0,126 0,068 1,860 0,063 
Household’s head age  30 - 39 0,140 0,071 1,970 0,048 
Household’s head age 40 - 60 0,366 0,097 3,770 0,000 
University level education 0,269 0,095 2,830 0,005 
High school level education 0,128 0,090 1,420 0,155 
Primary school level education 0,082 0,076 1,070 0,283 
Farmers 0,621 0,057 10,840 0,000 
Double active (farmers+wage earners) 0,291 0,068 4,270 0,000 
Pensioneers 0,241 0,056 4,290 0,000 
Self employed -0,039 0,161 -0,250 0,806 
One child -0,015 0,052 -0,290 0,775 
Two children -0,061 0,065 -0,940 0,350 
Three children or more -0,134 0,084 -1,580 0,114 
constant -1,559 0,141 -11,060 0,000 
     
rho  0,088 0,024   
Log pseudolikelihood = -7922.7008 ,  Wald chi2(36)   =     785.11 Prob > chi2 = 0.00, Number of obs =10390                                                   
Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1) = 13.243    Prob > chi2 = 0.0003 
 Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995) 1039 obs 
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Probability of buying  and working on informal markets           
Recursive bivariate probit model  
 marginal effects* 
variable dy/dx Std, Err, Average 
    
Working on informal markets 
(instrumented) 0,451 0,133 0,123 
Household’s head 
Unemployed -0,106 0,014 0,038 
Inactive -0,075 0,011 0,361 
Household’s head age less 
than 30 0,030 0,017 0,210 
Household’s head age  30 - 39 0,033 0,017 0,416 
Household’s head age 40 - 60 0,091 0,026 0,295 
University level education 0,068 0,026 0,114 
High school level education 0,030 0,022 0,245 
Primary school level education 0,019 0,017 0,589 
Farmers 0,179 0,020 0,090 
Double active (farmers+wage 
earners) 0,076 0,020 0,046 
Pensioneers 0,057 0,014 0,364 
Self employed -0,009 0,035 0,015 
One child -0,003 0,012 0,437 
Two children -0,014 0,014 0,214 
Three children or more -0,029 0,018 0,183 
   
y  =Pr(achat=1) (predict, pmarg)=0,147, dy/dx is for discrete change 
 of dummy variable from 0 to 1 at the average point, Number of obs =10390                                                   
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995),  10390 obs. 
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Table B3 
Probability of buying  and hiring on informal markets           
Recursive bivariate probit model  
 
variable Coef, 
Robust  Std, 
Error z P>|z| 
Hiring equation       |     
     
Household’s head Unemployed -0,823 0,247 -3,340 0,001 
Inactive -1,180 0,097 -12,170 0,000 
Local unemployment below the national 
average. 0,141 0,048 2,940 0,003 
Local unemployment above the national 
average 0,056 0,053 1,070 0,286 
Household’s head age less than 30 -0,026 0,085 -0,310 0,754 
Household’s head age  30 - 39 -0,002 0,084 -0,020 0,985 
Household’s head age 40 - 60 0,318 0,105 3,030 0,002 
City  20000-99999 inhabitants 0,222 0,100 2,230 0,026 
City below 20000 inhabitants 0,462 0,100 4,600 0,000 
Countryside 0,741 0,082 9,040 0,000 
University level education -0,216 0,131 -1,650 0,099 
High school level education -0,261 0,111 -2,360 0,018 
Primary school level education -0,169 0,098 -1,730 0,084 
Farmers 1,092 0,061 17,880 0,000 
Double active (farmers+wage earners) 0,499 0,076 6,560 0,000 
Pensioneers 0,402 0,091 4,410 0,000 
One child 0,299 0,078 3,840 0,000 
Two children 0,421 0,085 4,940 0,000 
Three children or more 0,298 0,091 3,280 0,001 
constant -2,334 0,159 -14,680 0,000 
     
Buying equation        |     
Hiring on informal markets (instrumented) | 2,165 0,354 6,120 0,000 
Household’s head Unemployed -0,214 0,103 -2,090 0,037 
Inactive -0,085 0,067 -1,270 0,205 
Household’s head age less than 30 0,076 0,066 1,160 0,245 
Household’s head age  30 - 39 0,056 0,065 0,860 0,388 
Household’s head age 40 - 60 0,094 0,077 1,220 0,224 
University level education 0,221 0,088 2,510 0,012 
High school level education 0,066 0,082 0,800 0,422 
Primary school level education 0,044 0,075 0,580 0,559 
Farmers -0,045 0,132 -0,340 0,734 
Double active (farmers+wage earners) -0,040 0,089 -0,450 0,655 
Pensioneers 0,094 0,059 1,600 0,110 
One child 0,017 0,048 0,350 0,729 
Two children -0,025 0,056 -0,450 0,654 
Three children or more 0,012 0,059 0,200 0,842 
constant -1,335 0,104 -12,860 0,000 
rho  0,764 0,016   
Log pseudolikelihood = -5601.4322,  Wald chi2(34)=1329.77 Prob > chi2=.0000Wald test of rho=0: chi2(1)=712.593 Prob 
> chi2 = 0.0000, Number of obs =10390                                                   
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995,) 10390 observations 
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Probability of buying  and hiring on informal markets           
Recursive bivariate probit model  
 marginal effects* 
 
variable  dy/dx Std, Err, Average 
Hiring on informal markets 
(instrumented) 0,499 0,082 0,073
Household’s head Unemployed -0,044 0,019 0,033
Inactive -0,019 0,015 0,358
Household’s head age less than 30 0,018 0,016 0,210
Household’s head age  30 - 39 0,013 0,015 0,417
Household’s head age 40 - 60 0,022 0,019 0,298
University level education 0,056 0,024 0,115
High school level education 0,015 0,020 0,245
Primary school level education 0,010 0,017 0,589
Farmers -0,010 0,029 0,091
Double active (farmers+wage earners) -0,009 0,020 0,047
Pensioneers 0,022 0,014 0,369
One child 0,004 0,011 0,438
Two children -0,006 0,013 0,216
Three children or more 0,003 0,014 0,185
y  =Pr(achat=1) (predict, pmarg)=0,147, dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable 
 from 0 to 1 at the average point, Number of obs =10390                                                   
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995) 
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Table B4 
Probability of working or hiring versus buying on informal markets 
Recursive bivariate probit model 
 
 
variable     
 
Working or hiring equation Coef, 
Robust  
Std, Error z P>|z| 
  
Household’s head unemployed 0,356 0,072 4,910 0,000 
Inactive -0,390 0,057 -6,890 0,000 
Local unemployment below the national average. -0,091 0,035 -2,590 0,010 
Local unemployment above the national average 0,057 0,040 1,450 0,148 
Household’s head age less than 30 -0,104 0,061 -1,700 0,088 
Household’s head age  30 - 39 -0,161 0,060 -2,660 0,008 
Household’s head age 40 - 60 -0,261 0,075 -3,490 0,000 
City  20000-99999 inhabitants 0,006 0,048 0,130 0,900 
City below 20000 inhabitants 0,121 0,054 2,240 0,025 
Countryside 0,309 0,043 7,180 0,000 
University level education -0,371 0,089 -4,180 0,000 
High school level education -0,416 0,080 -5,210 0,000 
Primary school level education -0,205 0,073 -2,830 0,005 
Farmers 0,664 0,054 12,390 0,000 
Double active (farmers+wage earners) 0,233 0,068 3,440 0,001 
Pensioneers 0,133 0,057 2,310 0,021 
Self employed 0,508 0,125 4,060 0,000 
One child 0,336 0,054 6,240 0,000 
Two children 0,471 0,059 8,010 0,000 
Three children or more 0,562 0,062 9,010 0,000 
constant -1,041 0,106 -9,850 0,000 
     
Buying equation             
  
Hiring or working  2,101 0,388 5,410 0,000 
Household’s head Unemployed -0,547 0,111 -4,930 0,000 
Inactive -0,116 0,064 -1,820 0,068 
Household’s head age less than 30 0,120 0,066 1,820 0,068 
Household’s head age  30 - 39 0,138 0,067 2,070 0,039 
Household’s head age 40 - 60 0,286 0,079 3,610 0,000 
University level education 0,363 0,096 3,770 0,000 
High school level education 0,216 0,091 2,380 0,018 
Primary school level education 0,114 0,077 1,490 0,137 
Farmers 0,090 0,123 0,730 0,463 
Double active (farmers+wage earners) 0,053 0,080 0,660 0,511 
Pensioneers 0,125 0,057 2,170 0,030 
Self employed -0,143 0,158 -0,910 0,364 
One child -0,055 0,052 -1,060 0,288 
Two children -0,134 0,066 -2,030 0,042 
Three children or more -0,189 0,077 -2,450 0,014 
constant | -1,654 0,130 -12,700 0,000 
rho | 0,414 0,018   
Log pseudolikelihood = -8403.3828, Prob > chi2=0.0000, Wald chi2(36)=1123.63, Nb. of obs=10390 
Wald test of rho=0:chi2(1)= 396.875,Prob>chi2=0.0000, Number of obs =10390                                    
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995) 
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Probability of working or hiring and  buying on informal markets 
Recursive bivariate probit model 
marginal effects* 
 
variable   dy/dx Std. Err. Average 
Working or hiring 0,484 0,089 0,179 
Household’s head Unemployed -0,095 0,013 0,038 
Inactive -0,026 0,014 0,361 
Household’s head age less than 
30 0,029 0,016 0,448 
Household’s head age  30 - 39 0,032 0,016 0,240 
Household’s head age 40 - 60 0,070 0,020 0,210 
University level education 0,096 0,029 0,416 
High school level education 0,053 0,023 0,295 
Primary school level education 0,026 0,017 0,206 
Farmers 0,022 0,031 0,126 
Double active (farmers+wage 
earners) 0,013 0,019 0,372 
Pensioneers 0,029 0,014 0,114 
Self employed -0,031 0,031 0,245 
One child -0,013 0,012 0,589 
Two children -0,030 0,014 0,090 
Three children or more -0,041 0,016 0,046 
y  =Pr(achat=1) (predict, pmarg)=0,147, dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy 
 variable from 0 to 1 at the average point, Number of obs =10390                                                   
Source: Computed from GUS  Extended Labor Force Survey  (1995) 
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Table B 5 
Panel  AIDS (system)  estimates of the  change in budget shares  for the probability of 
participation in informal markets 
 
     
Food 0.6035 B 0.19772           
   (2.7542)         
 0.70354 W  0.216550  
   (15.43)  
 0.8663 QGLS 0.19392          282.90317 
   (2.9178 )     
Alcohol and tobacco 1.0814 B 0.03736           
   (1.74516)        
 0.6554   W 0.0102         
   (2.69 )         
 1.1336 QGLS 0.038445        68.213459 
      (1.99720 )   
Clothing 1.0719 B -0.05575          
   (1.48440)        
 1.19621  W 0.00281           
   (4.06)              
 1.1513 QGLS -0.05221       104.66421      
   (1.53260 )  
Dwelling  charges) 0.7847 B -0.05002          
   (0.8158  )        
 0.90667 W -0.0205           
   (-18,07)  
 0.8645 QGLS -0.03783  69.384424      
   (0.6985 )  
Dwelling (equip) 2.1186 B -0.01947          
   (0.67645)        
 2.348  W 0.0046             
   (0.81 )         
 1.4644  QGLS -0.030226      96.776936      
   (1.21118 )   
Health 1.055 B -0.09882          
   (4.10473)        
 1.1525 W -0.0339            
   (-7.29)          
 1.006 QGLS -0.10067   69.719117 
      (4.91130)  
Hygiene 1.0370 B 0.009655         
   (0.85566)        
 0.8222 W -0.0107            
   (4.87 )             
 0.8925 QGLS 0.008448    42.117644  
   ( 0.85041)  
Education 1.1159 B -0.01160          
   (0.60331          
 0.99828 W 0.0109             
   (3.17 )         
 0.6575 QGLS -0.004322       105.40015    
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Culture   (-0.24917 )  
 1.7616 B -0.15015          
   (4.6641 )         
 1.312 W -0.0525            
   (-8.41 )         
 1.1516  QGLS -0.13177       89.267688 
   (4.3626 )         
Transp. &com. 1.9853 B 0.10087           
   (2.6459 )        
 1.81 W 0.0259             
   (3.36)          
 2.822 QGLS 0.06490          675.89938 
   (1.6998)  
 
B= between estimates, W= within estimates, QGLS = Quasi Generalized Least Squares estimates 
1.Student (robust) statistics in parenthesis 
2.Income instrumented by total expenditure and  socio-demographic variables. 
3.Income elasticities computed at the average level of budget share 
Source: Computed from GUS  Household Budget panel  (1994-1995) (4809 observation per year) 
.
 37 
Table B6 
 Total Expenditure Elasticities 
Panel QAIDS (system) estimates 
 
 Participation 
coefficient 
Non-
participants 
Partici 
pants 
Participation 
coefficient 
Non- 
participant
s 
Partici 
pants 
 “between estimates” “within estimates” 
Food 
 
-0.011 
(.054) 
0.604 
(.020) 
0.683 
(.067) 
-0.2x10-7 
(5x10-7) 
0.490 
(.0271) 
0.307 
(.083) 
Alcohol + 
tobacco 
0.030 
(.017) 
0.999 
(.006) 
0.992 
(.021) 
ns 0.401 
(.090) 
-0.099 
(.285) 
Clothing 
 
-0.019 
(.028) 
1.397 
(.059) 
0.967 
(.209) 
ns 1.058 
(.091) 
1.911 
(.279) 
Dwelling 
(charges) 
-0.033 
(.047) 
0.890 
(.040) 
1.352 
(.188) 
ns 1.300 
(.059) 
1.414 
(.244) 
Dwelling 
(equipment) 
0.66x10-4 
(.023) 
1.871 
(.059) 
1.256 
(.319) 
ns 2.160 
(.147) 
2.249 
(.386) 
Transport and 
com. 
0.94 
(.031) 
1.597 
(.051) 
1.843 
(.175) 
ns 1.594 
(.077) 
2.124 
(.232) 
Health 
 
-0.020 
(.022) 
1.145 
(.049) 
1.019 
(.223) 
ns 1.266 
(.071) 
0.948 
(.284) 
Culture  
Education 
-0.047 
(.020) 
0.897 
(.039) 
0.881 
(.206) 
ns 0.955 
(.042) 
1.011 
(.231) 
Miscellaneous 
 
0.028 
(.017) 
1.757 
(.102) 
2.306 
(.350) 
-0.8x10-8 
(.75x10-8) 
2.164 
(.158) 
1.454 
(.420) 
Notes: 
Qaids Specification: wiht = αi + Σj γij ln pjt + βi ln [mht/a(pt)] + {[λi/b(pt)] ln [m/a(p)]}2 + Wht.γi + uiht with ln a(pt) =  α0 + Σj αi ln pit +0.5 
ΣiΣj γij ln pit. ln pjt  and b(pt) = Πi pitβi  
Logarithm of total Expenditures instrumented. 
Other determinants : logarithmic age of the head, proportion of children in the family, relative logarithmic prices, education and 
location dummies, quarter dummies for each year. The true price index is approximated by a Stone price index. 
Estimation Method : by convergence, 75th iteration estimated on pooled cross-sections, on the integrability parameter b(p). 
Additivity constrained.  
Ns : Not significant 
Source: Computed from GUS  Household Budget panel  (1994-1995) (4809 observation per year) 
 
